

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

Information Service

VOL. IV—NO. 14

SEPTEMBER 14, 1928

CONTENTS

	Page
Hungary's Position After the World War	278
Three Periods in the Little Entente's History	281
Ex-King Charles Upsets Conciliation Plans	282
Periodic Conferences of Little Entente States	283
The Little Entente Turns to European Affairs	285
Treaty Between France and Czechoslovakia	287
Agreements of Italy and Yugoslavia	288
Italian-Hungarian Treaty Marks New Period	289
The League Investigates St. Gotthard Incident	290
Appendix: Conventions Forming the Little Entente	293
Other Treaties of Czechoslovakia	294
Other Treaties of Yugoslavia and Rumania	295

Published bi-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 18 East 41st Street, New York, N. Y. JAMES G. McDONALD, *Chairman*; RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL, *Research Director*; WILLIAM T. STONE, *Editor*. *Research Assistants*: HERBERT W. BRIGGS, DOROTHY M. HILL, E. P. MACCALLUM, HELEN H. MOORHEAD, M. S. WERTHEIMER, AGNES S. WADDELL. Subscription Rates: \$5.00 per year; to F. P. A. members \$3.00; single copies 25c.

The Little Entente

THE two *foci* of international relations in Eastern Europe after the war were the fear of White Hungary and the fear of Red Russia. The growth of the Little Entente hinged chiefly upon the developments in Hungary. The Little Entente is built on a series of alliances among Hungary's neighbors, designed to secure the benefits derived from the Treaty of Trianon and to counter the actions of Hungary which, rightly or wrongly, have been interpreted by Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia as attempts to overturn the *status quo* in Central Europe. The new states were naturally drawn together by a common desire to uphold the new order established by the Peace Treaties. Rumania felt herself menaced by both Russia and Hungary. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were concerned with Hungary and had no particular quarrel with Russia.

The heterogeneous Empire of the Hapsburgs, stretching from the Adriatic beyond the Carpathians, was supplanted on the map of Central Europe by several new sovereign

states: the small republic of Austria; an independent Hungary, one-third the size of the Hungary which formed half of the Dual Monarchy; the new republic of Czechoslovakia; a Rumanian state twice its former size; reconstituted Poland which includes the former Austrian province of Eastern Galicia; and Yugoslavia, in which pre-war Serbia is incorporated.

Hungary has been the storm center of these so-called Succession States. It is here that monarchist agitation for the return of the Hapsburgs has been the most prevalent and propaganda for revision of the frontiers has been the most insistent. Austria, with her capital city of Vienna comprising almost a third of the total population of the Republic, shorn of most of her important industries, and finding the independent existence forced upon her by the peace treaties* very difficult, has not inspired fear among her neighbors. The Austrians have not been in a position to protest as vigorously as the Hungarians.

*Cf. F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III., No. 20, December 9, 1927. "Problem of an Austro-German Union."

HUNGARY'S POSITION AFTER THE WORLD WAR

Post-war Hungary is a state of approximately 35,000 square miles; pre-war Hungary had an area of about 125,000 square miles. Her population has been reduced from 20,890,000 to 7,540,000. Of these, 6,250,000 are Magyars (Hungarians). Germans and Jews form the largest minorities. Thus Hungary has lost approximately two-thirds of her territory and three-fifths of her former peoples. Of the 20,890,000 people in pre-war Hungary, only 9,345,000

were Magyars. The other 11,545,000 comprised six considerable racial minorities, who were under the domination of the Magyars. Not only were most of these minorities placed under other governments by the new boundary delimitation, but large groups of Magyars were cut off from Hungary, as the following tables indicate. Table I shows the division of the old Hungarian territory, and the percentages and numbers of population involved. Table II indicates the numbers of people of each race in the groups included in the new states.

TABLE I *

New States	Square miles acquired from former Hungarian Kingdom	Per cent of population of former Kingdom acquired	Total population acquired
Hungary	35,174	36	7,540,000
Austria	1,583	2	330,000
Czechoslovakia	23,784	17	3,560,000
Jugoslavia	24,247	20	4,200,000
Rumania	39,344	25	5,210,000
Fiume	21	—	50,000
	<hr/> 124,153	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 20,890,000


TABLE II *

	Magyars	Germans	Jews	Slovaks	Rumanians	Ruthenes	Jugoslavs	Others
Hungary	6,250,000	480,000	460,000	180,000	50,000		50,000	70,000
Austria	25,000	235,000	20,000				50,000	
Czechoslovakia ..	955,000	120,000	270,000	1,720,000	10,000	430,000	5,000	50,000
Jugoslavia	560,000	460,000	40,000	60,000	70,000	10,000	2,850,000	150,000
Rumania	1,550,000	520,000	138,000	10,000	2,820,000	20,000	50,000	102,000
Fiume	5,000	2,000	2,000				15,000	26,000
	<hr/> 9,345,000	<hr/> 1,817,000	<hr/> 930,000	<hr/> 1,970,000	<hr/> 2,950,000	<hr/> 460,000	<hr/> 3,020,000	<hr/> 398,000

During the Paris Peace Conference the internal situation in Hungary was very disturbed, and this greatly affected the delimitation of the new Hungarian frontiers. Within a period of about six months in 1919, the Magyar state experienced the excesses of both a Red and a White terror. After the breakdown of the Dual Monarchy, Hungary had proclaimed itself a republic on November 16, 1918, and a provisional government was formed under Count Michael Karolyi. The decision of the Allies to partition Hungary according to racial groups, coupled with the Allied decision to allow Rumanian troops to advance into Transylvania in March, 1919, finally caused the downfall of Count Karolyi.

Hungary was suffering from the continuation of the Allied blockade, and there was a severe shortage of food. Hungarians returning from Russia after the war spread the doctrines of Communism among the hungry masses. As a result, after Karolyi's resignation, the reins of power were seized on March 21, 1919, by Bela Kun, a Communist, and Soviets were formed on the Russian model. In a desperate attempt to minimize Czechoslovak and Rumanian annexations from Hungary, and also to unify Hungary internally by the time-honored means of proceeding against a foreign enemy, Bela Kun attacked the Czechs and then the Rumanians during the period from April to June, 1919. The situation had become so acute that on June 13 the Peace Conference intervened and forced Bela Kun

*Temperley, Harold. *Foreign Affairs*, New York, April, 1928. "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," p. 447.



Map prepared by the
Foreign Policy Association

to retire on the Czech front. Fighting continued with the Rumanians, who occupied Budapest on August 8, 1919. The Big Four at Paris had been forced by Bela Kun's action to come to a decision in regard to Hungary's frontiers, and announcement of their delimitation was made on June 13. Bela Kun's régime collapsed in August, 1919, and a moderate Socialist Government took office on August 2. This was followed by other governments until in November, 1919, Admiral Horthy took over the affairs of Hungary. As Regent, he has remained at least nominally at the head of the state ever since.

The three months between August and November, 1919, were marked by the renewal of royalist agitation in Hungary, and the emergence of the Archduke Joseph of Hapsburg on the scene. The Austrian and Czechoslovak Governments, alarmed by this, made representations to the Peace Conference, and the resulting Allied-Hungarian negotiations finally caused Joseph's withdrawal. Various candidates for the crown of St. Stephen had been put forward in Budapest, but there was no unanimity; and that situation exists to this day.

HUNGARY'S NEIGHBORS FORM THE LITTLE ENTENTE

For a time, immediately after the war, on the initiative of Rumania, unsuccessful attempts were made to weld all the new states into an alliance. Less ambitious plans for an alliance against Hungary were finally carried out through the initiative of Dr. Eduard Benes, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, who was the chief architect of the Little Entente. This combination of states, representing a total of 42,000,000 people, has to a certain extent filled the role of the heterogeneous Dual Monarchy in the international relations of Central Europe. The conventions of defensive alliance which constitute the Little Entente are:

1. Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia, August 14, 1920;
2. Czechoslovakia-Rumania, April 23, 1921;
3. Yugoslavia-Rumania, July 2, 1921.

Feeling the need for a solid front among the Succession States of the old Empire, Dr. Benes approached M. Trunbic of Yugoslavia in December, 1919, in Paris, with the

project of a Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance. On January 5, 1920, similar negotiations were opened with Rumania. In February, 1920, direct negotiations took place between Prague and Belgrade. The conclusion of an alliance was hastened by the Kapp *putsch* in Germany in March of that year, and the fear of a restoration of the old order led to the signature on August 14, 1920, of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Convention of Alliance. The preamble of this instrument stated that its main purpose was the maintenance of the Treaty of Trianon. In case of an unprovoked attack upon either state by Hungary, the two states were to assist one another in accordance with the terms of a military convention to be drawn up later.* Furthermore neither party was to conclude an alliance with a third party without giving previous notice to the other. The convention was to remain in force for two years, and it was to be registered with the League of Nations.

Czechoslovakia and Rumania were slower in arranging an alliance, but immediately after the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav convention, Dr. Benes and M. Ionescu of Rumania agreed that in case of an unprovoked attack by Hungary, they would assist one another pending the conclusion of a formal convention of defensive alliance.

Yugoslavia and Rumania at this time were at odds over boundary delimitation, especially in the Banat section, and a treaty of alliance seemed for the time being impossible. However, fear of a restoration in Hungary outweighed frontier jealousies and a treaty of defensive alliance on the model of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Convention was signed on July 2, 1921. The Yugoslav-Rumanian instrument contained an additional statement in the preamble to the effect that the purpose of the convention was for the maintenance of the Treaty of Neuilly (the peace treaty with Bulgaria) as well as the Treaty of Trianon.

In the meantime, Rumania and Czechoslovakia had signed on April 23, 1921, a convention of defensive alliance which was identical with the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Convention except that it contained an explicit provision that the two governments

*This military convention was signed on August 1, 1921.

should pursue a concerted policy in regard to Hungary. A supplementary military convention between Czechoslovakia and Rumania was signed on July 2, 1921, giving teeth to the political instrument.

THREE PERIODS IN THE LITTLE ENTENTE'S HISTORY

Thus the Little Entente came into being. There appear to be three phases through which the Little Entente has passed since its inception. The first period, one of intense anti-Hungarian feeling, lasted from the Peace Conference until 1923, when the Little Entente decided not to oppose Hungarian reconstruction by the League of Nations. This period was characterized by Red and White terrors in Hungary, intransigence of Hungary towards the Trianon settlement, two attempted *coup d'etats* by Charles of Hapsburg, and the resulting strong action of the Little Entente. Hungary's admission to the League in September, 1922, although not opposed by the three allies, did not mark the end of this period. It was only after the Sinaia Conference of the Little Entente and the Fourth League Assembly in 1923, when some of the difficulties were settled and Hungarian reconstruction was begun.

The second period, extending from 1924 until 1927, was one of less antagonism towards Hungary. During this time the three states concluded important treaties of alliance and friendly collaboration with the great powers, particularly France and Italy, while always keeping a watchful eye on Hungary. As late as November 11, 1927, Yugoslavia signed a treaty of arbitration and friendship with France.

The third period has been marked by renewed fears of Hungary. Three events excited the Little Entente at the expense of the peaceful atmosphere in the Danubian states. On April 5, 1927, the hitherto isolated Hungary signed a treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration with Italy, which had the effect of tightening perceptibly the previously relaxed bonds between the Little Entente states. In June, 1927, a violent and prolonged press campaign was started in the London *Daily Mail* by Lord Rothermere for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon to Hungary's advantage. This

agitation has kept Hungary's neighbors in a constant state of tension. On January 1, 1928, the discovery at St. Gotthard, a frontier station between Austria and Hungary, of a munitions shipment marked "machinery parts," originating in Italy and bound for Hungary although addressed elsewhere, greatly disturbed the three allies. The Little Entente seems in a sense to have entered a phase of more intense anti-Hungarian feeling though not nearly so violent as that immediately after the end of the war.

HAPSBURG EFFORTS TO REGAIN THRONE

The first test of the Little Entente, and an example of the power which it wields, came when ex-King Charles of Hapsburg attempted to regain the throne of Hungary. In fact, it was this incident which precipitated signature of the conventions of alliance between Czechoslovakia and Rumania and between Yugoslavia and Rumania, respectively eight and ten months after the signing of the original Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Convention.

Mention has been made of the return of the Archduke Joseph of Hapsburg in August, 1919, and his withdrawal at the instance of the Allied Supreme Council. This council had placed a ban on the return of any Hapsburg as head of the Hungarian Government. In February, 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors declared publicly that a Hapsburg restoration in Hungary could not be regarded as merely a domestic affair of the Hungarian state, and that it would be "neither recognized nor tolerated" by the principal allied powers. On January 27, 1921, Dr. Benes said in a speech in the Czechoslovak Parliament that an attempt to restore the ex-King Charles "would constitute for certain of Hungary's neighbors a veritable *casus belli*," and furthermore that "95 per cent of the difficulties with neighboring states would disappear the moment that those neighbors of the Hungary of today found evidence of an evolution in the direction of democracy and republicanism, which would reassure them on the question of her internal régime."

Charles had renounced all share in the government of Austria and Hungary respectively in two statements of November

11 and 13, 1918, but he had refrained from making a formal abdication. On March 27, 1921, he suddenly appeared in Hungary. At once the Allied representatives in Budapest together with the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, protested to the Hungarian Government. On March 30, Dr. Benes instructed the Czechoslovak Minister to tell the Hungarian Government that Czechoslovakia would break off diplomatic relations with Hungary unless Charles left the country at once; and furthermore that Czechoslovakia, as a last resort, would blockade the Magyar State with a "military demonstration" in accordance with the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Convention. On the following day the Hungarian Government told the Czechoslovak Minister that all steps had been taken for effecting the departure of Charles, and that Hungary regarded the matter as an internal affair. This action was approved on April 1 at an extraordinary session of the Hungarian Parliament. On the same day Dr. Benes privately told the Hungarian Government that in case such action were not taken, the states of the Little Entente would intervene immediately "*avec la dernière énergie*." In the meantime the Conference of Ambassadors had reaffirmed its declaration of February, 1920, and expressed the expectation that the Hungarian Government would "take effectual measures to suppress an attempt which, if it succeeded even for a moment, could only have disastrous consequences for Hungary."

Dr. Benes, leaving no stone unturned, delivered an ultimatum to Hungary giving Charles until 6 p. m. on April 7 to leave the country. However, the note from the Conference of Ambassadors arrived in Budapest on April 4, and Charles retired to Switzerland. The incident indicates the seriousness with which not only the Little Entente but also the Allies regarded any attempt at restoration in Hungary. Its most important effect was to hasten the conclusion of the definite defensive alliance conventions between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and Yugoslavia and Rumania.

EX-KING CHARLES UPSETS CONCILIATION PLANS

During the summer and fall of 1921, there were two meetings between the Hun-

garian Foreign Minister, the Presidents of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and Dr. Benes, which attempted to effect a *rapprochement*. Little progress was made, mainly because Charles, breaking his promise not to return to Hungary, suddenly arrived by airplane on October 20, 1921, in the Burgenland. The possession of this province was at that time in dispute between Austria and Hungary, and conditions there were disturbed. Charles was joined by several irregular armed bands which were attempting forcibly to prevent its transfer to Austria from Hungary in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. The Budapest representatives of the Allied Powers and of the Little Entente protested to the Hungarian Government, demanding that Charles immediately be removed. Charles was already proceeding against Budapest. The Hungarian Government complied, sent troops against him, dispersed the rebels, and captured Charles on October 24.

Meantime, Dr. Benes had announced that the presence of Charles in Hungary was a *casus belli*, and that Czechoslovakia was making preparations to mobilize and would take energetic measures against Hungary in concert with the other members of the Little Entente. Furthermore, he declared that, even though Charles were removed, the Little Entente would apply the greatest pressure, not stopping short of military measures, if necessary, "in order to obtain the final settlement of the Hapsburg question in Hungary and to avert once and for all the danger created by the House of Hapsburg in Central Europe." Mobilization was decreed in both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on October 23, and actually was begun on October 27 in Czechoslovakia.

Representations by the Little Entente to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris resulted in a note to Budapest demanding the formal deposition of Charles and his arrest and removal from Hungary under conditions to be fixed by the Allies. The powers declined "all responsibility regarding the intervention of the states bordering on Hungary or for the resulting consequences" if the Hungarian Government failed to comply at once.

Dr. Benes, threatening military sanctions,

demanding of Hungary that the entire Hapsburg dynasty be deprived of its rights to the Hungarian throne. He also demanded a written engagement promising strict execution of the Treaty of Trianon. At the same time he requested the Allies to allow the Little Entente states to be represented on a special sub-commission of the Hungarian Disarmament Commission, and an indemnity from Hungary for the costs of mobilization. The Hungarian Government accepted the demand for the extradition of Charles, although it did not refer to his deposition or to the exclusion of the Hapsburg dynasty; and virtually appealed to the Allies for protection against the Little Entente. On November 1, Charles was removed from the scene. The other demands, unfulfilled, kept the situation still critical.

The Conference of Ambassadors finally informed Dr. Benes and his Yugoslav and Rumanian colleagues that the control of Hungarian disarmament was its concern, although the conference welcomed the exchange of information on the subject with the Little Entente. The ambassadors stated further that "since the Hungarian Government had succeeded, with the means at its own disposal, in putting an end to the enterprise of the ex-King Charles IV, [and] since under these conditions the Allied Powers had declared themselves satisfied," the demand for an indemnity could not be entertained; and that, "in face of the correct attitude actually adopted by the Hungarian Government," military intervention would be quite unjustified. Finally, the Conference of Ambassadors invited the Little Entente to demobilize.

FORMAL DEPOSITION OF HAPSBURG DYNASTY

The Allies, in another note, however, did call upon Hungary immediately to proclaim the deposition of both Charles and the Hapsburg Dynasty. Budapest complied with the request to abrogate the sovereign right of Charles, but passed "an act which restores to the nation the right of proceeding to a free election of its king," thus retaining the monarchical form of government and making Hungary a monarchy with the kingship in abeyance. This did not satisfy Dr. Benes, and further correspondence took place be-

tween Prague and Paris, which resulted in another demand from the Conference of Ambassadors that Hungary expressly declare the Hapsburg Dynasty ineligible. Budapest finally made a formal declaration, with which the Conference of Ambassadors was satisfied. It bound the Hungarian Government to abide by the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors of February 4, 1920, and April 3, 1921, forbidding a Hapsburg restoration. No election of a king was to be held without a previous understanding with the Conference of Ambassadors, and a law was to be passed forbidding propaganda for the Hapsburgs. At Dr. Benes' request, in order to give this declaration an "international juridical character," it was officially communicated to the Czechoslovak Government by the Conference of Ambassadors on November 15, 1921. The Czechs then demobilized.

The result of all these negotiations and demands was a victory for the policy of the Little Entente and particularly for the diplomacy of Dr. Benes, who had taken the initiative throughout. Except for indemnity for mobilization costs, he had obtained every one of his demands. There had been no resort to actual force, and diplomatic relations had not been broken off with Hungary. Nevertheless, the incident further embittered the atmosphere of Central Europe and retarded rather than advanced the restoration of peaceful conditions.

The crisis did, however, draw Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia more closely together. Rumania had at various times during the negotiations shown a tendency to follow a separate course, particularly following the lead of Italy.* Counterbalancing the rather lukewarm Rumanian attitude was the fact that Poland had declared its agreement with the Little Entente on the Hapsburg question.

PERIODIC CONFERENCES OF LITTLE ENTENTE STATES

The Little Entente has held periodic conferences at which its specific problems have been discussed and a unified policy adopted. Before the Genoa Conference in 1922, two preparatory meetings of the group were

*The reason for this was doubtless Rumania's anxiety to have Italy ratify the treaty of October 28, 1920, between the principal Allied Powers and Rumania, by which Rumania got international recognition of her annexation of Bessarabia. Italy did not ratify this treaty until March 9, 1927.

held, at the second of which Poland was represented. As a result the four states presented a united front at the Genoa Conference and acted with a greater unity than they had yet been able to achieve in the local affairs of Eastern Europe.*

In August, 1922, Poland was again represented at a Little Entente conference which agreed that common action should be taken to preserve the economic and political independence of Austria. It was also decided that Hungary's admission to the League of Nations should not be opposed if she definitively accepted the Treaty of Trianon; and that there should be concerted action by the Little Entente on questions of minorities and frontiers.

At the Third Assembly of the League of Nations in September, 1922, Hungary was admitted to membership, the Little Entente states voting in favor of admission. The Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made this special declaration in the Hungarian application to the League: "It is also my duty to declare in the name of my government, which, in requesting the admission of Hungary, is backed by the overwhelming majority of the nation, that Hungary sincerely means to fulfill the regulations of the League of Nations, the treaties concluded and all international obligations." The latter were interpreted to mean "all her international obligations in accordance with treaties or acts subsequent to their signature."

The sub-committee of the Sixth Commission of the Assembly, which dealt with Hungary's application, "took note of the assurances contained in Count Banffy's statement and drew his attention to certain points regarding the execution of the clauses of the Treaty of Trianon relating to the reduction of armament and also to the international engagements of Hungary with regard to the protection of minorities, defined in Articles 54 to 60 of that Treaty." During the discussion of Hungary's application for membership, M. Osusky, delegate of Czechoslovakia, called the attention of the Assembly to certain breaches on the part of Hungary

in fulfilling the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Trianon.*

HUNGARIAN RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LITTLE ENTENTE

In April, 1923, Hungary raised the issue of her need of financial assistance by formally requesting the Reparation Commission to lift the charges imposed on her assets by the Treaty of Trianon. Rumania and Jugoslavia had important claims against Hungary. The Succession States were greatly concerned with problems of security raised by any moves to strengthen Hungary. After the war the victors were apparently bent both on reducing the vanquished states to helplessness and on keeping them in a weak condition, as a means of safeguarding their own security. However, as war passions subsided common sense reasserted itself, and it became evident to the cooler heads that this policy could not be continued. This was especially true in the Danubian countries, which practically since the beginning of the industrial era had been an economic unit. The new states built on the ruins of the Hapsburg Empire had immediately surrounded themselves with tariff walls, and trade was correspondingly disrupted in an area which had formerly been an economic unit.

The Portorose Conference of November, 1921, at which were represented Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Great Britain and France, and to which the United States sent an observer, had made an effort to break down import and export restrictions and tariff walls and to reestablish the badly disorganized transportation systems of the Succession States. Although only partially successful, this conference was an honest attempt to relay the foundations of the economic edifice of Southeastern Europe.**

After Hungary's appeal for international financial assistance, the Little Entente held one of its periodic conferences at Sinaia, in July, 1923, at which it was decided not to oppose the reconstruction of Hungary under

*Cf. Toynbee, Arnold J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23*, p. 301.

*Cf. League of Nations, *Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings*, Vol. I, p. 115-116; *Ibid.* Vol. II, Annex 6, A. 68, 1922, p. 122-123; *Ibid.* *Minutes of the Sixth Committee*, Annex 4, p. 55-56.

**Cf. *International Conciliation*, No. 176, July, 1922. "The Portorose Conference."

certain conditions. The decision was regarded as a step towards reconciliation and as significant of recognition of the necessity for cooperation in the Danubian area. Dr. Benes in a speech* in the Czechoslovak Parliament on October 30, 1923, summed up his opinion of the Sinaia decision and the conditions laid down by the Little Entente as follows:

"At Sinaia the countries of the Little Entente came to an understanding concerning the new policy to be followed with regard to Hungary—a policy which must be one of reconstruction and collaboration in so far as the internal situation of Hungary will allow. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania agreed as to the economic and political conditions on which they would be prepared to consent to the suspension, for a certain period, of the mortgage on part of the Hungarian state property. It was decided to demand a degree of financial control which would prevent the misuse of the money lent to Hungary; it was also decided to ask those of the Allies who had made concessions to Hungary in the matter of reparation to make equivalent concessions to the Little Entente countries;** it was also decided that guarantees should be required from Hungary concerning the loyal and peaceful policy which that country must pursue towards her neighbors; and finally, it was decided to ask for a definite settlement of the question of disarmament and for the signature of a political protocol similar to the Austrian protocol signed at Geneva, which would oblige Hungary and other countries to pursue a loyal policy of peace."

IMPROVED RELATIONS IN DANUBIAN CENTRAL EUROPE

Even after the Sinaia decision there remained several specific disputes which had embittered Hungary's relations with her neighbors over a period of years and defied all attempts at settlement. Before Hungarian reconstruction could be officially arranged, it was necessary that the Little Entente states should not only acquiesce in the reconstruction plan but actively collaborate in it through the League of Nations. They had the power to block action by the

League through Czechoslovakia's seat on the League Council. The Fourth Assembly of the League (September, 1923) offered an opportunity for frequent meetings between Count Bethlen of Hungary and Dr. Benes and the other Little Entente foreign ministers who were in Geneva, meetings which both had felt to be desirable but which had hitherto been impracticable. As a result of these informal conversations, the outstanding disputes between Hungary and her three neighbors were in process of settlement. On September 29, 1923, the Little Entente states took the initiative in proposing "that should an invitation be received from the Reparation Commission, the Council should authorize the Financial Committee and the Secretariat" of the League to take the necessary action on the understanding that representatives of the three Little Entente states should be permitted to sit as members of the League Council when the reconstruction of Hungary was under discussion. This was agreed to and the greatest obstacle to Hungary's reconstruction by the League was thus removed. On March 14, 1924, the two Reconstruction Protocols were signed at Geneva, and tension in Danubian Central Europe became somewhat relaxed.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE TURNS TO GENERAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

With the diminishing of what has been termed the "political vortex created by the recalcitrance of Hungary toward the Trianon Treaty and by the concern to safeguard the treaty which this Hungarian attitude had produced"* the Little Entente became for the time less concerned with Hungary and began to show a tendency to engage in general European affairs. Before this time individual members of the alliance had concluded treaties with various other states which are also of importance in a consideration of the history of the Little Entente. It was not until 1924, however, that they became drawn more or less into the orbits of the great powers.

On March 3, 1921, a Convention of Alliance between Poland and Rumania was signed. As has been indicated, Rumania was concerned in protecting herself against Russia, because of her annexation of Bessa-

*Cf. Toynbee, Arnold J. *op. cit.*, p. 302-303.

**These states, especially Czechoslovakia, were debtors to the Allies on account of "costs of liberation."

*Cf. Toynbee, Arnold J. *op. cit.*, 1924, p. 440.

rabia, and against Hungary because of Transylvania. The Polish-Rumanian treaty provided mutual assistance "in the event of their being the object of an unprovoked attack on their present eastern frontiers." The two governments undertook to consult together on matters of policy concerning their relations with their eastern neighbors. A separate military convention determined "the manner in which either country shall render assistance should the occasion arise." In case of war, neither party is to negotiate or conclude a separate armistice or peace. This alliance was renewed on March 26, 1926, by a Treaty of Guarantee which provides that mutual assistance shall be rendered by the two states "acting in application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations." The new treaty further binds Poland and Rumania to settle all disputes between them by conciliation or arbitration.

Polish-Czechoslovakian relations were strained for some time due to boundary disputes in the Teschen, Zips and Orava districts, which were not finally settled until 1924. After the settlement of these difficulties, the two states on April 23, 1925, signed a Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation which was subsequently ratified and registered at Geneva. This treaty provides for peaceful settlement of all disputes between the parties except those regarding territorial status. Poland also concluded with Yugoslavia a Treaty of Friendship and Cordial Collaboration, which was signed on September 18, 1926, but has not yet been ratified although it has been communicated to the League of Nations by the Polish Government "for information."* By the terms of this treaty, the two governments "undertake to concert their action in all matters of foreign policy which are mutually recognized as affecting the interests of both contracting parties." In other questions of foreign policy, they "undertake, in the event of any international difficulties, to proceed to an immediate exchange of views in the most friendly spirit."

Thus all three members of the Little Entente are bound by treaty with Poland in varying degrees of intimacy ranging

from Rumania's defensive alliance to Yugoslavia's as yet unratified "cordial collaboration."

POLICIES TOWARDS AUSTRIA AND SOVIET RUSSIA

The question of an independent Austria was of the first importance to all members of the Little Entente and particularly to Czechoslovakia. One of the principal points in the program of the group is firm opposition to the union of Austria and Germany.* Were the *Anschluss*, as it is called, to take place, Czechoslovakia, with its large German minority, would be caught by a German pincer. Both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain forbid the *Anschluss*, except by (unanimous) vote of the Council of the League of Nations. The dire economic situation of Austria after the war made her continued independent existence precarious, and it was not until October, 1922, that the protocols instituting the reconstruction scheme of the League of Nations were finally signed. In the meantime Czechoslovakia had taken no chances. Dr. Benes, realizing that the fate of Austria was inseparably bound up with that of the other Succession States, had arranged a non-political conference of these states which met at Portorose from October 15 to November 25, 1921. This conference paved the way for economic treaties. In December, 1921, Austria and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty at Lana by which the two states mutually guaranteed "their territories as fixed by the Treaties of Peace" and pledged neutrality in case of war. Czechoslovakia then extended credits to Austria as a basis for the resumption of ordinary commercial intercourse.

None of the Little Entente states has recognized Soviet Russia *de jure*, although Czechoslovakia signed a trade treaty with Moscow on June 5, 1922, which accords *de facto* recognition. It was felt that the Bessarabian affair concerned only Rumania. The policy of the Little Entente towards Russia is summarized in the official communique published on January 13, 1924, after the Belgrade Conference, stat-

*Cf. League of Nations, C. 653 M. 216. 1927 V., *Arbitration and Security*, p. 373 et seq.

*Cf. F. P. A. *Information Service*. Vol. III., No. 20, December 9, 1927. "The Problem of an Austro-German Union."

ing that the Little Entente would "leave liberty of action to each of its members in order to allow them to take account of the circumstances of the moment and of their own special situations."* Although Rumania has attempted at various times to obtain a united front against Russia, her government has consistently insisted on maintaining freedom of action.

TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

France, in her desire for security, felt the need for new Allies although she had concluded alliances with Belgium in September, 1920 and with Poland in February, 1921. Italy, concerned with the control of the Adriatic, and evidently looking towards a hegemony of the Balkans just as France appears to have done, was also flirting with the Little Entente states. On January 25, 1924, France and Czechoslovakia signed a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship which was similar to the Little Entente treaties in its objects but not in its obligations. This agreement provided that the parties must consult each other on questions of foreign policy involving their security or the peace treaties; and that they should agree as to measures to safeguard their interests when threatened. Both parties also promised to consult each other in case Austria tried to unite with Germany or in case either Hungary or Germany attempted to restore the monarchy. "In accordance with the principles set forth in the Covenant of the League of Nations," disputes between the two signatories are to be submitted to arbitration. The signature of this treaty in the midst of the Ruhr occupation led to rumors that Czechoslovakia intended to invade Germany, and that the Czechoslovak army would be placed under the control of the French General Staff. Both governments denied, however, the existence of any military agreement supplementary to the treaty.

The signature of the Locarno agreements in 1925 placed the relations of France and Germany with Czechoslovakia on a new and more friendly footing. Treaties of compulsory arbitration relating to

disputes of every kind were signed between Germany and Czechoslovakia. France and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty mutually guaranteeing each other's frontiers and promising aid in case of unprovoked aggression against either signatory. With Germany's entrance into the League in September, 1926, the "spirit of Locarno" seemed to pervade relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

RUMANIA AND JUGOSLAVIA MAKE TREATIES WITH FRANCE

Rumania and Yugoslavia were slower in concluding treaties with France. Rumania signed a Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration with the French Republic on June 10, 1926. Yugoslavia signed two treaties with Paris on November 11, 1927, one of arbitration, the other of friendship. In 1923, the year she went into the Ruhr, France had offered loans to Yugoslavia and Rumania, and also to Poland, so that they might purchase munitions and other military supplies from France. Rumania refused the offer, while Yugoslavia and Poland accepted it.

The Franco-Rumanian and Franco-Yugoslav treaties are practically identical. The signatories agree not to take part in any attack or invasion against each other except in case of legitimate self-defense or of action under a decision of the League. They also reserve the right to go to war in case the League Council is not unanimous in conciliating a dispute. If attacked without provocation, the governments will agree as to respective action "within the framework of the Covenant" in order to safeguard their national interests and to maintain the *status quo* established by the peace treaties. They agree to take similar action if an attempt is made to modify the political *status quo* of Europe, subject to any resolution which may be made by the Council or Assembly of the League. A final article specifically states that nothing in the treaties can be interpreted or applied in a manner to injure the rights and obligations of the signatories under the League Covenant. The parties agree to peaceful settlement of all disputes between them, and machinery for such settlement is provided. These treaties stress ar-

*Cf. Toynebee, Arnold J., op. cit., 1924, p. 450.

bitration and renunciation of war to a greater extent than the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty, and in fact the latter contains no specific provision renouncing war.

The French agreements with the Little Entente states differ from old-style alliances in that they are not accompanied by military pledges and are definitely subordinated to the obligations of the parties under the League Covenant.

AGREEMENTS OF ITALY AND JUGOSLAVIA

Italy had early been drawn into Central European affairs by her relations with Yugoslavia. On November 12, 1920, simultaneously with the signature of a treaty settling the status of Fiume and defining the Italian-Yugoslav frontier, Italy and Yugoslavia signed a defensive agreement undertaking to watch over the maintenance of the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon and to take concerted action to prevent a restoration of the Hapsburg dynasty. Furthermore, they undertook to lend one another necessary diplomatic (not military) assistance and to inform one another of any hostile action against the other party in Austria or Hungary. The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Convention was communicated to Italy, and on February 8, 1921, there was exchange of notes between Dr. Benes and Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, which referred to the identity of interests and policy between Italy and Yugoslavia and stated that the agreements and undertakings between Italy and Yugoslavia were equally binding as between Italy and Czechoslovakia.

Curiously enough, on the day before the Yugoslav Parliament voted on January 28, 1924, to accept the offer of French credits, the Italian and Yugoslav Governments signed at Rome a general treaty of Friendship and Cordial Collaboration, as well as an agreement regarding the most important question of Fiume. While the treaty was not so close an agreement as the Franco-Czechoslovak instrument, the two signatories undertook to give one another mutual support for the maintenance of the treaties of Trianon, St. Germain and Neuilly. Each party pledged itself to neutrality in case the other was attacked with-

out provocation. The signatories also undertook to consult one another "as to the steps to be taken in common" to protect their common interests which "are or may be threatened" in the "event of international complications."

The conclusion of this treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia was unexpected, for relations between the two states had been consistently strained, and continued so because of questions involving Albania and the control of the Adriatic.* France, with whom the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom had been friendly, from the first had desired to negotiate an alliance with her but had been refused. The Italian-Yugoslav Treaty was therefore looked upon as a rebuff to France and also to Czechoslovakia, whose recent treaty with Paris was not regarded favorably in Belgrade. This may have been due to a feeling of pique against Dr. Benes' leadership in the Little Entente. Both Czechoslovakia and France were temporarily placed on the defensive, and Franco-Italian relations were not helped.

Czechoslovakia and Italy in May, 1924 concluded a Cordial Collaboration Treaty which was signed on July 5, 1924. This is analogous to the Italian-Yugoslav agreement, but does not provide for neutrality in case one of the signatories is attacked. Rumania and Italy signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cordial collaboration on September 16, 1926. This pact, in general similar to the Italian treaties with the other Little Entente states, provides as well for peaceful settlement of disputes, but does not contain a neutrality clause. Italy promised Rumania at the time of the signature of this treaty that she would ratify the treaty of October 28, 1920, by which Rumania obtained international recognition of her annexation of Bessarabia. On March 8, 1927, Italy ratified this treaty, which then came into force.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE FROM 1924 TO 1927

Between 1924 and 1927 there had been comments to the effect that the Little Entente was "dead" or "dying." That was far from true, although the period was

*Cf. F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 8, June 22, 1927. "Albania: The Problem of the Adriatic."

marked by a slight loosening of the bonds of the three allies. This was due partly to growing divergencies of interests which proved stronger than their common interest in keeping Hungary down; partly to the fact that Hungary was on the whole quieter and less intransigent during this period; and partly to the desire of France and Italy to enter into closer relations with the three states, and the resulting conclusion of the treaties which have been described.

Actions of Budapest had, indeed, often aroused the Little Entente capitals during this second period. There was, for example, the famous franc forgery case at the end of 1925 and in 1926, when Hungary once more occasioned a formal declaration from the Little Entente. Charges had been made of the counterfeiting of huge amounts of French francs in Hungary for the purpose of financing extreme reactionary and anti-Semitic monarchist groups. Government officials were supposedly implicated, and arrests were made of persons in high stations. A parliamentary commission investigated the affair. Feeling within Hungary ran so high as to cause a virtual reign of terror. The Little Entente of course was very perturbed. The counterfeiters were subsequently tried, some being acquitted and others receiving light sentences.

ITALIAN-HUNGARIAN TREATY MARKS A NEW PERIOD

The third period in the history of the Little Entente began in 1927. Early in April of that year Count Bethlen journeyed to Rome, where he was cordially received and royally entertained. During his visit the Italian-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration of April 5, 1927, was negotiated and signed. It was ratified by both the Italian and Hungarian parliaments, the exchange of ratifications taking place in Rome on August 8, 1927, and was registered at Geneva on November 1, 1927. The treaty provides for "constant peace and perpetual friendship between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Hungary" and both kingdoms promise to settle all future disputes between them by peaceful means. It runs for

ten years and, unless denounced a year before its expiration falls due, will "remain in force for a further period of ten years, and similarly thereafter." Thus it may be considered a long-term treaty. At the same time that this treaty was signed, Mussolini and Bethlen exchanged notes whereby Fiume on the Adriatic was designated as the principal trade outlet for Hungary, giving that landlocked state access to the sea.

The repercussions in Central Europe of the Italian-Hungarian agreements were profound. The treaty was the first concluded by Hungary with a former enemy state in which the Magyar state appeared, for diplomatic purposes, as the entire equal of the co-signatory, and Hungary was jubilant. Her attitude is expressed in this comment of a Budapest journalist: "The Little Entente put an iron ring around Hungary. The ring is still there, but Hungary is no longer within it!" Announcement of the signature of the treaty came a short time before one of the periodic conferences of the Little Entente, at Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia, on May 13 to 15. The effect was a tightening of the loosened bonds of the three allies.

LORD ROTHERMERE URGES REVISING HUNGARIAN FRONTIERS

Not long after this, Hungary's campaign for revision of her frontiers which has been going on in varying degrees of intensity ever since the Peace Conference, received unexpected and strenuous support from the outside. In June, 1927, Lord Rothermere, publisher of the London *Daily Mail*, instituted a campaign for the restoration to Hungary of a large part of the territory taken from her under the Treaty of Trianon. Mr. Lloyd George was reported as favoring revision. Articles by Lord Rothermere himself and by Mr. Dudley Heathcote have appeared frequently during the past fourteen months, urging such a move. The keynote of the argument is in these extracts from Lord Rothermere's initial article, in the *Daily Mail* of June 21, 1927:

"Eastern Europe is strewn with Alsace-Lorraines. By severing from France the twin provinces of that name the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 made another European war inevitable.

The same blunder has been committed on a larger scale in the Peace Treaties which divided up the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. They have created dissatisfied racial minorities in half a dozen parts of Central Europe, any one of which may be the starting point of another conflagration. . . .

"I suggest that the time has come for the Allied Powers who signed that arbitrarily drafted instrument, the Treaty of Trianon, to consider the frontiers it laid down, in the light of the experience of the past seven years. . . .

"We ought to root up all the dry grass and dead timber of the Treaty of Trianon before some chance spark sets fire to it. Once the conflagration has started it will be too late."

Excitement in the Little Entente countries over the Rothermere campaign and Italy's official profession of friendship for Hungary was further intensified by the discovery on January 1, 1928, of five carloads of machine guns, labelled "machine parts," at St. Gotthard, a frontier station between Austria and Hungary. The shipment came from Verona, Italy, and was addressed to a town in Czechoslovakia although evidently intended for Hungary. The papers required by the Trianon Treaty to allow munitions to traverse Hungary were lacking. The Little Entente states, especially Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, were greatly stirred over the affair, and accused Italy of arming Hungary contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Trianon.

THE LEAGUE INVESTIGATES ST. GOTTHARD INCIDENT

Control of the disarmament of Hungary had been removed from inter-allied agencies on March 31, 1927, and entrusted to the League of Nations. Therefore, on February 1, 1928, the three states of the Little Entente requested the League Council to investigate the St. Gotthard affair. On February 23, Budapest announced that the machine guns had been destroyed and the parts would be sold next day. This was followed by a peremptory telegram from the President of the Council calling on Hungary to delay the sale. It appears that this action was taken after consultation with the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street. Count Bethlen in his reply denied the right of investigation and, while say-

ing that he could not stop the sale, agreed because of his "high regard for the President of the Council" to request the purchasers to allow the scrap iron, into which the guns had been converted, to remain on the spot until the League could inspect it. Bethlen's reply is regarded as a direct slap at the League. The right of investigation is given to the League by Article 143 of the Treaty of Trianon:

So long as the present treaty remains in force, Hungary undertakes to submit to any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.

The affair came before the League Council at its March meeting. A commission of investigation was appointed, and reported to the Council at its regular June session. Italy had been opposed to the investigation but did not block the Council's action. Probably largely because of Italy's attitude, the Council in June rather whitewashed the whole affair, deciding that a technical violation of the Trianon Treaty had occurred and exonerating Hungarian customs and railway officials. As to the origin of the smuggled arms, a discreet silence was observed.

In the meantime, Lord Rothermere's campaign was prosecuted with vigor, despite the fact that Downing Street let it be known that the British Government had nothing to do with it. Count Bethlen, while doubtless delighted with Rothermere's support, has attempted to cool the resulting enthusiasm at home, realizing its possible disadvantageous political effects. He has not been very successful, however. Lord Rothermere has received a message of thanks reported to have a million Hungarian signatures. In March, 1928, the Rothermere press published an exclusive interview with Mussolini in which the Italian dictator expressed himself as favoring revision of Hungary's frontiers. In a speech to the Italian Senate on June 5, 1928, Mussolini said that Hungary had been treated too severely in the Trianon Treaty, and said further that peace would be better secured if the peace treaties in some instances were "really revised."

**THE LITTLE ENTENTE TAKES
FIRM STAND AGAINST HUNGARY**

All this agitation has once more aroused the Little Entente. Dr. Benes in the summer of 1927 wrote Lord Rothermere that he was badly informed on Central European affairs. In answer Rothermere pleaded the Hungarian cause while disclaiming any unfriendliness towards Czechoslovakia. The official position of the Little Entente was stated by Dr. Benes in a speech to the foreign affairs committee of the Czechoslovak chamber on June 6, 1928, in which he said:

"The agitation for revision of the Peace Treaties reveals the consolidation of Europe. I saw the situation not only in France but also particularly in England. Not only the governments and official circles are patterning their policies strictly on the Peace Treaties but other political groups as well are not taking a single step

which might shatter the peace of Europe. Any one who does not recognize this fact, whether in Hungary or outside Hungary, is simply playing with fire and is without conscience. That is the Czech viewpoint, and that of the Little Entente. Any attempts to weaken the firm solidarity of the Little Entente states regarding all these questions appear simply laughable to us. I affirm that in regard to all Central European questions complete unity of opinion prevails between the states of the Little Entente and between Ministers Marinkowitsch (Jugoslavia), Titulescu (Rumania) and myself."*

At the Bucharest Conference of the Little Entente on June 18, 1928, the same sentiments were evidenced. And so, in spite of many serious differences of opinion in regard to other matters, the Little Entente stands together firmly against Hungary.

**Frankfurter Zeitung, Zweites Morgenblatt, June 7, 1928, p. 1.*

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APPENDIX

CONVENTIONS FORMING THE LITTLE ENTENTE

Signatories	Type of Treaty	Date & Place of Signature	Ratifications Exchanged	Date of Registration	Text Available	Duration
Czechoslovakia— Yugoslavia	Convention of Alliance	Belgrade Aug. 14, 1920	Belgrade Feb. 10, 1921	Aug. 30, 1921	T.S.VI:210	2 Years
Czechoslovakia— Yugoslavia	Renewal	Marianske Lazne Aug. 31, 1922	Belgrade Oct. 3, 1922	Nov. 16, 1922	T.S.XIII:233	2 Years
Czechoslovakia— Rumania	Convention of Alliance	Bucharest Apr. 23, 1921	Bucharest May 27, 1921	Aug. 30, 1921	T.S.VI:216	2 Years
Czechoslovakia— Rumania	Renewal	Prague May 7, 1923	Prague June 14, 1923	July 16, 1923	T.S.XVIII:83	3 Years
Czechoslovakia— Rumania	Renewal	Bucharest June 13, 1926	Bled June 17, 1926	Sept. 2, 1926	T.S.LIV:255	3 Years
Jugoslavia— Rumania	Convention of Alliance	Bucharest July 2, 1921		Not registered	World Peace Foundation Pamphlets Vol.VI:122	2 Years
Jugoslavia— Rumania	Renewal	July 7, 1923				
Jugoslavia— Rumania	Renewal	July 13, 1926				

OTHER TREATIES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

With	Type of Treaty	Date & Place of Signature	Ratifications Exchanged	Date of Registration	Text Available	Duration
Austria	Political Agreement	Prague Dec. 16, 1921	Prague Mar. 15, 1922	Apr. 11, 1922	T.S.IX:248	5 Years
Austria	Arbitration & Conciliation	Vienna Mar. 5, 1926	May 31, 1926	July 28, 1926	<i>Arbitration and Security</i> , p. 245 et seq.	10 Years
France	Alliance & Friendship	Paris Jan. 25, 1924	Mar. 4, 1924	Mar. 15, 1924	T.S.XXIII:164	
France	Guarantee	Initialled at Locarno Oct., 1925 Signed London, Dec. 1, 1925			Final protocol of the Locarno Conference (and annexes) together with treaties between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia cmd. 2525 H. M. Stationery office, London, 1925.	
Italy	Exchange of Notes concerning Identity of Interests.	Feb. 8, 1921				
Italy	Cordial Collaboration	Rome July 5, 1924	Rome Aug. 21, 1924	July 14, 1924	T.S.XXVI:21	5 Years
Germany	Compulsory Arbitration	Initialled at Locarno, Oct. 16, 1925; Signed London, Dec. 1, 1925			Final protocol of the Locarno Conference (and annexes) together with treaties between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia cmd. 2525 H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1925.	
Hungary	Commercial Convention	Prague May 31, 1927	Budapest July 24, 1927	Aug. 18, 1927	T.S.LXV:63	
Poland	Political Convention	Nov. 6, 1921	Not ratified	Not registered	<i>L'Europe Nouvelle</i> , May 5, 1923, p. 569 et seq.	
Poland	Arbitration & Conciliation	Apr. 23, 1925	Prague Apr. 14, 1926	May 25, 1926	<i>Arbitration and Security</i> , p. 236 et seq.	5 Years

OTHER TREATIES OF JUGOSLAVIA

With	Type of Treaty	Date & Place of Signature	Ratifications Exchanged	Date of Registration	Text Available	Duration
France	Arbitration	Paris Nov. 11, 1927	Paris Dec. 2, 1927	Dec. 9, 1927	<i>Arbitration and Security</i> , p. 325 <i>et seq.</i>	5 Years
France	Friendship	Paris Nov. 11, 1927	Paris Dec. 2, 1927	Dec. 9, 1927	<i>Arbitration and Security</i> , p. 360 <i>et seq.</i>	5 Years
Italy	Friendship & Cordial Collaboration	Rome Jan. 27, 1924	Rome Feb. 22, 1924	Apr. 7, 1924	T.S.XXIV:32	5 Years
Poland	Conciliation & Arbitration	Geneva Sept. 18, 1926	Not yet ratified	Communicated by Poland, Dec. 15, 1927	<i>Arbitration and Security</i> , p. 342 <i>et seq.</i>	5 Years

OTHER TREATIES OF RUMANIA

With	Type of Treaty	Date & Place of Signature	Ratifications Exchanged	Date of Registration	Text Available	Duration
France	Friendship & Arbitration	Paris June 10, 1926	Paris Nov. 8, 1926	Nov. 22, 1926	T.S.LVIII:227	10 Years
Italy	Cordial Collaboration	Rome Sept. 16, 1926	Rome July 18, 1927	Nov. 1, 1927	<i>Arbitration and Security</i> , p. 383 <i>et seq.</i>	5 Years
Poland	Defensive Alliance	Bucharest Mar. 3, 1921	Bucharest July 25, 1921	Oct. 24, 1921	T.S.VII:78	5 Years
Poland	Guarantee; renewal of Alliance of Mar. 3, 1921	Bucharest Mar. 26, 1926	Warsaw Feb. 9, 1927	Mar. 7, 1927	T.S.IX:163	5 Years

